In the wake of high-profile failures like Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Venezuela, many members of Congress, pundits, and even President Trump continue to support regime change as a tool for promoting American foreign policy goals. They argue that armed efforts to replace illegitimate regimes can achieve those goals more cheaply and quickly than sustained diplomacy and engagement. But the empirical evidence, as well as decades of academic research, disproves this claim. Regime-change operations are incredibly difficult to pull off and, when they do succeed, they frequently result in a host of unintended consequences—including civil war, human rights abuses, and regional instability.
The most successful cases of regime change involve a government that steps down in the face of sustained pressure from international pressure and an electoral process that installs a new, legitimate government. For example, a widely celebrated example of such success is Nelson Mandela’s election to the presidency of South Africa in 1994, which arose from international pressure, a peaceful transition, and a new, legitimate government.
A large body of literature explains how such elections are likely to produce the desired outcomes by analyzing the dynamic equilibrium of a regime-change game. At the start of the game, a regime optimizes its office rents by deciding how much to spend on public goods. Over time, the regime learns about citizens’ preferences and adjusts its office rents accordingly. Citizens also gain information about the regime’s strength and optimally decide on their participation rate.
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