In most armed conflicts, very few issues are resolved on the battlefield, so negotiations are vital. Yet they often fail, and even when a deal is reached it doesn’t always last. What explains the variation in peace process outcomes? This article explores how the negotiation framework – the legal, public, and inclusive structure that a government sets up to facilitate negotiations – makes a difference. It explains that negotiating under such a framework is more likely to succeed because it alleviates adversaries’ information asymmetry and commitment problems, sets conditions to protect the process from exogenous shocks (crises in other parts of the political life or sporadic acts of violence), and increases the number of actors involved in conflict management during the talks.
To illustrate these points, the article focuses on two cases: Colombia and Turkey. Both countries feature high-profile and heavily polarized armed conflicts between state and non-state actors, including a wide range of civic advocacy groups devoted to the cause of peace. These advocacy groups, which often cooperate with armed resistance movements and splinter from the main political parties, have played crucial roles in influencing the content of the peace talks.
However, the case studies also highlight that waiting for a “ripe moment” to start high-level peace talks can delay progress and lead to extreme suffering. This is because leaders weigh the costs of engaging their enemy in peace talks, such as the risk that the enemy would see such a move as a sign of weakness. The article argues that, to address this challenge, policy makers should focus on making peace talks more appealing to all stakeholders.
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